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The Origins of Religious Disbelief:
A Dual Inheritance Approach
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Abstract
Widespread religious disbelief represents a key testing ground for theories of religion. We evaluated the predictions of three
prominent theoretical approaches—secularization, cognitive byproduct, and dual inheritance—in a nationally representative
(United States, N ¼ 1,417) data set with preregistered analyses and found considerable support for the dual inheritance
perspective. Of key predictors of religious disbelief, witnessing fewer credible cultural cues of religious commitment was the most
potent, b ¼ .28, followed distantly by reflective cognitive style, b ¼ .13, and less advanced mentalizing, b ¼ .05. Low cultural
exposure predicted about 90% higher odds of atheism than did peak cognitive reflection, and cognitive reflection only predicted
disbelief among those relatively low in cultural exposure to religion. This highlights the utility of considering both evolved
intuitions and transmitted culture and emphasizes the dual roles of content- and context-biased social learning in the cultural
transmission of disbelief (preprint https://psyarxiv.com/e29rt/).
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Evolutionary approaches to religion have proliferated in recent
years, and different theories make starkly different predictions
about the existence, nature, and origins of religious disbelief.
Atheists—merely people who do not believe in the existence
of a God or gods—constitute a large and perhaps growing pro-
portion of earth’s human population. A prominent estimate
from about a decade ago (Zuckerman, 2007) posits the exis-
tence of 500–700 million atheists globally. This estimate is in
all likelihood a drastic underestimate (Gervais & Najle, 2018).
People routinely overreport their religious practices (Hadaway
et al., 1993), and indirect measurement of atheism in the United
States reveals a potentially large gulf between some indirect
(*26%) and direct (*3%) estimates of atheist prevalence
(Gervais & Najle, 2018). Combining direct estimates and infer-
ences drawn from the few available indirect estimates, we sus-
pect that upward of 2 billion people on earth may in fact be
atheists. Many evolutionary theories of religion posit a univer-
sal or near-universal implicit theism (Barrett, 2004, 2010;
Bering, 2010; Boyer, 2008) and may thus be fundamentally
incompatible with global atheism that is simultaneously preva-
lent and deliberately concealed. Here, we test predictions on
atheism from three prominent theoretical frameworks, as out-
lined in Table 1: secularization, cognitive byproduct, and an
emerging dual inheritance model of religion (Norenzayan &
Gervais, 2013; Norenzayan et al., 2016). This project situates
the study of religious disbelief firmly within established theo-
retical frameworks for studying the evolution of human beha-
vior and contributes to broader discussions of the role of
transmitted versus evoked culture in core aspects of human
nature (Laland & Brown, 2011).
Prominent Theoretical Approaches
Three of the most prominent current approaches to religion and
disbelief are secularization theories, the cognitive byproduct
approach made popular by evolutionary psychology and the
cognitive science of religion, and a dual inheritance approach.
Secularization. Secularization theories emerging from sociology
of religion (Inglehart & Norris, 2004; Marx, 1843; Schnabel,
2020) and social psychology (Inzlicht et al., 2011; Kay et al.,
2008) posit that religions serve some sort of societal or intrap-
sychic function, be it for bringing groups together or assuaging
existential concerns. As strong secular institutions emerge in
some places (Inglehart & Norris, 2004) or in situations in which
people feel secure and secular institutions can quench a thirst
for control and order (Kay et al., 2008), religious motivations
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wane. These approaches predict that religion should be nearly
universal but that atheism might emerge when (1) people
largely feel existentially secure or (2) secular institutions are
strong and effective.
Cognitive byproduct. Cognitive byproduct accounts, emerging
from both evolutionary psychology and the cognitive science of
religion, view the capacity for religious cognition as a byproduct
of adaptations that emerged for other functions (Barrett, 2004;
Boyer, 2008). This includes a putative Hyperactive Agency
Detection Device—oft posited, never substantiated41—and more
general mental adaptations for mind perception and social life.
The cognitive byproduct approach predicts near-universal theistic
belief. Atheism—if indeed, it is a genuine phenomenon rather
than a self-report illusion that only goes “skin deep” as some have
claimed (Bering, 2010)—would emerge only in special environ-
ments and conditions. For example, in this view, atheism could
result from subtle individual differences in the cognitive adapta-
tions that underpin the representation of supernatural agents such
as mind perception and advanced mentalizing. Alternatively, a
common refrain in the cognitive science of religion is that atheism
requires effortful cognitive reflection. Prominent scholars of this
tradition claim, for example, that atheism “require[s] . . .cognitive
effort” (Barrett, 2010) and that “disbelief is generally the result of
deliberate, effortful work” (Boyer, 2008). Cognitive science of
religion researchers repeatedly emphasizes that effortful cogni-
tive reflection underpins atheism. Prominent accounts (Barrett,
2010; Bering, 2010; Boyer, 2008) make the strong predictions
that atheism is rare, potentially superficial, and requires cognitive
effort. That said, more measured versions of the byproduct
account are compatible with a wider range of possible atheist
prevalence rates and required levels of cognitive effort. Thus,
byproduct accounts from the cognitive science of religion gener-
ally predict that atheism may arise, in some cases, through limited
mentalizing but (whether or not effort is strictly necessary)
that superior analytic thinking is probably the most important
predictor of atheism.
Dual inheritance. Some supernatural agent concepts might be
cognitively stickier than others by virtue of having contents
that are more evocative, memorable, or intuitively compelling
(Barrett, 2004; Boyer, 2008). However, it is a far step from
mentally representing or remembering a supernatural agent to
actually believing in one (Gervais & Henrich, 2010). To tackle
the challenge of belief in (rather than just mental representation
of) supernatural agents, work from cultural evolution and
gene–culture coevolution has emphasized that religious belief
emerges from the interaction of evolved cognitive architecture
and cultural learning.
In this view, people are biased to learn some concepts rather
than others due to either their contents (some ideas are memor-
able and evocative) or from the learning context. Several
context-dependent learning strategies may be especially impor-
tant in religious belief and disbelief. Conformist transmission
(learning common beliefs; Henrich & Boyd, 1998), prestige-
and success-biased learning (learning from winners; Henrich
& Gil-White, 2001), and behavioral cues diagnostic of under-
lying beliefs—termed credibility-enhancing displays (CREDs;
Henrich, 2009)—combine to powerfully influence what people
come to believe or disbelieve. This dual inheritance approach
does predict that religious belief will be widespread but also
predicts that atheism might naturally result in cultural contexts
devoid of consistent behavioral cues that a naive learner ought
to believe in any given god (Gervais & Henrich, 2010; Gervais
& Najle, 2015; Lanman, 2012; Lanman & Buhrmester, 2017).
In a dual inheritance framework, the individual differences in
refection or mentalizing highlighted by cognitive byproductists
may predict atheism, but cultural cues are probably much more
important.
These three broad approaches—secularization, cognitive
byproduct, and dual inheritance—make similar predictions about
religious belief: namely that it ought to be quite widespread. They
make sharply divergent predictions, however, about the nature of
disbelief. It is sensible, therefore, to consider the various potential
predictors of religious disbelief as a way to contrast the various
theories.
Four Pathways to Atheism
Distinct research trajectories have considered the preconditions
for sustained belief in any given god. To currently believe in a
god, one (1) must be able to mentally represent gods (Gervais,
2013; Norenzayan et al., 2012; Purzycki & McNamara, 2016;
Willard & Norenzayan, 2013), (2) must be dispositionally or
situationally motivated to believe in some gods (Kay et al.,
2008), (3) must receive credible cultural cues that some gods
are real (Gervais & Henrich, 2010; Gervais & Najle, 2015;
Lanman & Buhrmester, 2017), and (4) must maintain this intui-
tive belief over time. Tweaks to any of these four components
may instead yield disbelief in gods. Separate lines of research
partially support this supposition. First, mindblind atheism
Table 1. Predictions From Prominent Theories.
Theory Discipline Mindblind Apatheist InCREDulous Analytic
Secularization Sociology and social psychology þ þ þ þ
Cognitive byproduct Evolutionary psychology and the cognitive science of religion þ þ þ þ þ þ þ
Dual inheritance Gene–culture coevolution þ Indirect þ þ þ þ þ þ
Note.þ Symbols indicate the predicted strength of each pathway to atheism by theory. Mindblind¼ relatively lower in advanced mentalizing; apatheist¼ relatively
more existentially secure; inCREDulous ¼ exposed to relatively fewer religious credibility-enhancing displays; analytic ¼ scoring relatively higher on cognitive
reflection.
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describes the pattern whereby individual differences in advanced
mentalizing abilities predict religious disbelief (Norenzayan
et al., 2012; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013) in at least some sam-
ples (Maij et al., 2017). Second, apatheism describes the pattern
whereby, although people are highly religiously motivated when
life is insecure, unstable, and unpredictable, existential security
instead predicts reduced religiosity (Inglehart & Norris, 2004;
Kay et al., 2008). Third, inCREDulous atheism describes the pat-
tern whereby a lack of CREDs (Henrich, 2009) that one ought to
believe in any gods is a good global predictor of atheism (Gervais
& Najle, 2015; Lanman, 2012). Finally, analytic atheism
describes the pattern whereby people who reflectively override
their intuitions tend to be less religious than those who “go with
their guts” (Pennycook et al., 2016; Shenhav et al., 2012),
although the magnitude and consistency of this relation are deba-
table (Gervais et al., 2018).
Predictions
Prominent theoretical approaches make subtly diverging
predictions about which pathways to atheism (mindblind,
apatheism, inCREDulous, or analytic) are most important (see
Table 1). First, secularization models (Inglehart & Norris,
2004; Kay et al., 2008; Vail et al., 2012) posit that increases
in existential security (wealth, health, education, etc.) reduce
religious motivation. Thus, secularization approaches would
predict that measures of existential security and secular institu-
tions (general feelings of safety, faith in police, etc.) ought to be
primary predictors of atheism. Apatheism is the most important
pathway to disbelief per secularization theories.
Second, cognitive science of religion and evolutionary psy-
chology often view religion as a cognitive byproduct of other
mental adaptations (Barrett, 2004; Boyer, 2008) such as mind
perception (Gervais, 2013) or predator detection. In this view,
challenges in the core cognitive faculties underlying such adap-
tations (e.g., advanced mentalizing) would predict disbelief, but
the primary route to disbelief is people overriding their religious
intuitions via effortful cognitive reflection. Analytic atheism is
the most important pathway to disbelief per cognitive byproduct
theorists.
Finally, dual inheritance models highlight the cultural learn-
ing processes (Kline, 2015; Rendell et al., 2011) underpinning
religious beliefs (Evans, 2001; Lane et al., 2012; Richert et al.,
2017; Willard et al., 2016) and disbelief and largely predict that
context-biased social learning—especially CREDs (Henrich,
2009)—would be strongly associated with degrees of religious
belief (Gervais & Najle, 2015). Our dual inheritance approach
predicts that CREDs would be most important, followed by
other factors such as cognitive reflection, mentalizing, and per-
haps existential security. InCREDulous atheism is central to
dual inheritance approaches to religious disbelief.
We preregistered a set of analyses to simultaneously evalu-
ate the predictions of secularism, cognitive byproduct, and dual
inheritance models, https://osf.io/kfasv, in a probability sample
of U.S. American adults. Specifically, we posed three broad
questions:
What are the relative predictive contributions of each pathway
to atheism when considered simultaneously?
How do the four pathways interact with each other in predicting
disbelief?
Does early work on each individual pathway successfully repli-
cate in a nationally representative sample?2
To approach these questions, we contracted Growth from
Knowledge (GfK) to collect a nationally representative sample
of U.S. American adults (N ¼ 1,417). Primarily, we were inter-
ested in predicting degrees of religious belief and disbelief with
measures of (1) advanced mentalizing, (2) existential security,
(3) exposure to religious CREDs, and (4) cognitive reflection.
For robustness, we tested models using both continuous and
dichotomous measures of religious disbelief. We also included
a number of demographic and personality covariates to adjust
for theory-adjacent but nonetheless documented correlates of




We contracted GfK, which specializes in nationally representa-
tive sampling, to gather a probability sample of U.S. American
adults. This national probability sample included 1,685 indi-
viduals that were broadly representative of the American pop-
ulation in terms of gender (50.14% female, 49.51% male,
0.35% listing another gender), age (M ¼ 50.58, SD ¼ 16.83),
race/ethnicity, education, census region, household income,
homeownership status, and residence within a metropolitan
area.3 We excluded 268 participants who failed an attention
check or who did not complete all measures, leaving a total
of 1,417 respondents (see Table 2). Inferences do not appreci-
ably change under alternate exclusion criteria.
Measures
Religious belief. We tested models with two separate religious
disbelief measures. First, we relied on a popular continuous
measure of religious belief, the Supernatural Beliefs Scale
(Jong et al., 2013), as our main dependent measure of religious
belief. This scale was reliable, a ¼ .95, M ¼ 4.91, SD ¼ 1.63.
As a robustness check, we also included a binary item in which
participants simply indicated whether or not they believe
in God.
We also included various other measures of religiosity,
which were used to gain a more fine-grained understanding
of the demographics of our sample and are summarized in
Table 2. For example, we asked participants how often they
attended services outside of weddings and funerals and how
often they pray. We also asked participants to indicate the reli-
gion with which they identify, and they were allowed to select
multiple applicable categories (e.g., “atheist” and “agnostic”).
We included these variables primarily for descriptive purposes.
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Pathways to religious disbelief. We measured participants’ menta-
lizing abilities, feelings of existential security, exposure to
credible cues of religiosity (CREDs), and reflective versus
intuitive cognitive style.
We measured advanced mentalizing abilities, which corre-
spond to mindblind atheism, using the Perspective Taking
subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980).
This scale reached an acceptable level of reliability, a ¼ .77,
M ¼ 4.79, SD ¼ 0.78.
We measured feelings of existential security, which corre-
sponds to apatheism, with a number of items assessing con-
cerns that are salient to participants and participant faith in
institutions like the government, health care, and social security
to provide aid in the face of need (Willard & Cingl, 2017).
Items measuring faith in institutions were reverse-scored, and
all items were averaged together to form a composite index
of existential insecurity (a ¼ .77, M ¼ 2.2, SD ¼ 0.39).
We measured cognitive reflection, which corresponds to
analytic atheism, using nine items from the cognitive reflection
test (Frederick, 2005; Primi et al., 2016; Toplak et al., 2014).
Our full index of cognitive reflection is composed of the sum
of the nine questions that each participant answered correctly,
with a higher score thus indicating a more reflective and analy-
tic cognitive style. The average score was 3.18, with an SD
of 2.66.
We measured exposure to CREDs, which corresponds to
inCREDulous atheism, with the CREDs Scale (Lanman &
Buhrmester, 2017). This scale assesses the extent to which
caregivers demonstrated religious behaviors during the respon-
dent’s childhood, such as going to religious services, acting as
good religious role models, and making personal sacrifices to
religion. This scale was highly reliable, a ¼ .93, M ¼ 2.42,
SD ¼ 0.84.
Personality measures. We used the Mini-IPIP6 (Milojev et al.,
2013) to measure the personality factors of extroversion
(a ¼ .79, M ¼ 3.69, SD ¼ 1.12), agreeableness (a ¼ .75,
M ¼ 4.96, SD ¼ 0.92), conscientiousness (a ¼ .68, M ¼ 4.97,
SD¼ 0.97), neuroticism (a¼ .75, M¼ 3.52, SD¼ 1.08), open-
ness to experience (a¼ .73, M¼ 4.69, SD¼ 1.01), and honesty–
humility (a ¼ .76, M ¼ 4.8, SD ¼ 1.13).
General demographics. Finally, we included a demographics
questionnaire to adjust for known religion-predictive partici-
pant characteristics. We assessed education level by asking
participants what their highest level of education was, from
no formal education to professional or doctorate degree. We
used single face–valid items to assess both social (1¼ very lib-
eral to 7 ¼ very conservative; M ¼ 4.07, SD ¼ 1.77) and eco-
nomic (1 ¼ very liberal to 7 ¼ very conservative; M ¼ 4.36,
SD ¼ 1.54) political ideology.
Correlations. Correlations among all analyzed variables appear
in Figure 1 and Table 3.
Results
Analytic Strategy
We used Bayesian estimation throughout this study. Bayesian
estimation allows us to evaluate the credibility of different
parameter estimates, given data and statistical models (Etz &
Vandekerckhove, 2018; Kruschke, 2010, 2013; McElreath,
2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2016). Most analyses report a point
estimate reflecting the most credible parameter estimate and
Figure 1. Correlation plot of all analyzed variables. Circle size and
luminance depict relationship strength, and color depicts positive or
negative relationship.
Table 2. Sample Demographics.
Group % Group %
Education Religious identity
<High school 7.55 Catholic 22.94
High school 27.24 Evangelical 38.46
Some college 28.23 Jehovah’s witness 1.34
Collegeþ 36.98 Mormon 2.12
Jewish 2.40
God belief Muslim 0.35
Believer 81.27 Orthodox 0.56
Atheist 18.73 Hindu 0.35
Buddhist 0.64
Race/ethnicity Unitarian Universalist 1.20
White 74.45 Other Christian 7.41
Black 8.68 Other non-Christian 0.71
Not listed 4.30 No religion 13.27
Multiracial 10.16 Atheist 5.15
Hispanic 2.40 Agnostic 5.29
Not listed 4.73







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the highest posterior density interval (HPDI), the region in
which 97% of most credible estimates lie. We chose 97% cover-
age because it is no more arbitrary than any other cutoff but
provides a very conservative range of plausible values. We also
report a variety of posterior probabilities, which state the prob-
ability of something (b > 0, etc.) being true, given data and
model. Heuristically, the posterior probabilities have the proper-
ties people misintuit frequentist p values as having (e.g., the
probability of some hypothesis being true; Oakes, 1986), and the
HPDIs have the properties people misintuit frequentist confi-
dence intervals as having (e.g., the probability that a parameter
lies in that range; Hoekstra et al., 2014). We used gently regular-
izing priors throughout, primarily deployed to buffer against
model overfitting. Inferences are highly robust to nonludicrous
alternative priors. Full materials, data, and code are available at
https://github.com/wgervais/disbelief-origins.
Simultaneous Contributions
Our most important analyses considered the simultaneous
contributions of all four pathways operating in concert. As pre-
registered, we conducted analyses in which the four core fac-
tors predict individual differences in belief and disbelief,
both in the presence and absence of additional covariates. Mul-
ticollinearity among key predictors was not problematic, corre-
lations ranged from r ¼ .12 to .22. In our full model
predicting a continuous multiitem measure of religious disbe-
lief (see Measures section, for details), witnessing fewer cred-
ible displays of faith proved to be by far the most powerful
predictor of religious disbelief (see Table 4 and Figure 2).
CREDs of faith predict belief, and their absence predicts athe-
ism, b ¼ .28, [0.23, 0.34]4, p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 1.5 Cognitive
reflection remained a consistent predictor of religious disbelief,
b ¼ .13, [0.07, 0.19], p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 1, but following earlier
cross-cultural work (Gervais et al., 2018), its predictive power
was relatively meager. Lower scores on a measure of advanced
mentalizing abilities6 were reliably but weakly associated with
disbelief, b ¼ .05, [0.01, 0.11], p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 0.96, and
existential security predicted essentially nothing. Relatively,
fewer religious CREDs were the strongest predictor of atheism
when all four potential pathways are considered
simultaneously.
Atheism: Binary measure. We also measured religious disbelief
with a simple binary (no, yes) belief in God item. As a robust-
ness check, we reran our full model analysis as a logistic model
predicting atheism rates on the binary measure. Unsurprisingly,
results closely matched the continuous full model. Aside from
demographic covariates, only fewer religious CREDs, b ¼ .83,
[0.61, 1.05], p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 1, and more cognitive reflection,
b ¼ .38, [0.17, 0.59] ¼ p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 1, predicted atheism.
However, fewer religious CREDs again emerged as a stronger
predictor of atheism than did cognitive reflection. To illustrate,
we considered the posterior produced by our model, margina-
lized at various levels of our predictors. Specifically, we
compared the hypothetical probability of atheism for
model-predicted individuals who are either perfectly in CRED-
ulous (scoring at the floor for religious CREDs) but typical on
all other variables or else perfectly analytical (scoring at ceiling
on cognitive reflection) but otherwise typical. The predicted
odds of atheism are about 90% higher for a purely inCREDu-
lous individual, p (atheism | inCREDulous) ¼ 0.31, [0.24,
0.39], than for a purely analytic individual, p (atheism |
analytic) ¼ 0.20, [0.13, 0.28], odds ratio ¼ 1.87, [0.93, 3.03],
p (inCREDulous > analytic | data) ¼ 0.99. This relative differ-
ence in predictive strength for CREDs and cognitive reflection,
replicated across continuous and binary measures of disbelief,
is most consistent with a dual inheritance approach.
Hypothesized Interactions
Next, we probed for preregistered interactions7 finding an
interaction between cultural learning and reflective cognitive
style, b ¼ .08, [0.12, 0.03], p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 1. We con-
sidered the association between disbelief and reflective cogni-
tive style among those comparatively high and low on religious
CREDs (Figure 3), finding that reflective cognitive style pri-
marily predicts religious disbelief among those who were also
comparatively low in cultural exposure to credible religious
cues of faith. Indeed, cognitive reflection moderately predicted
religious disbelief among those witnessing the fewest religious
CREDs, b ¼ .26, [0.15, 0.35], p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 0, but not at all
among those highest in religious CREDs, b ¼ .01, [0.13,
0.10], p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 0.6. These patterns highlight the inter-
active predictive roles of cultural context and evolved intui-
tions on religious cognition. This interaction is consistent
with a dual inheritance perspective but not obviously predicted
by other prominent theoretical approaches.
Table 4. Predicting Disbelief: Full Model Summary.
Variable b HPDI p (b > 0)
Low mentalizing .05 [.01, .11] .96
High security .02 [.08, .04] .20
Low CREDs .28 [.23, .34] >.99
High reflection .13 [.07, .19] >.99
Age .01 [.04, .07] .67
Education .04 [.02, .10] .92
Male .07 [.02, .13] >.99
Social liberalism .44 [.35, .52] >.99
Economic conservatism .04 [.04, .12] .84
Extroversion .02 [.03, .08] .82
Conscientiousness .02 [.04, .07] .72
Neuroticism 0 [.06, .07] .54
Low agreeableness .10 [.04, .17] >.99
Openness .07 [.02, .13] >.99
Honesty/humility .04 [.02, .10] .92
Note. b ¼ standardized coefficient; HPDI ¼ 97% highest posterior density
interval; p (b > 0) ¼ posterior probability of b > 0; CREDs ¼ credibility-
enhancing displays.
6 Social Psychological and Personality Science XX(X)
Discussion
Summary
Overall, this study is one of the most comprehensive available
analyses of the cognitive, cultural, and motivational factors that
predict individual differences in religious belief and disbelief
(see also Willard & Cingl, 2017). Consistent patterns emerged,
suggesting that lack of exposure to CREDs of religious faith is
a key predictor of atheism. Once this context-biased cultural
learning mechanism is accounted for, reflective cognitive style
predicts some people being slightly more prone to religious dis-
belief than their cultural upbringing might otherwise suggest.
That said, this relationship was relatively modest. Advanced
mentalizing was a robust but weak predictor of religious belief,
and existential security did not meaningfully predict disbelief.
This overall pattern of results closely matched predictions of a
dual inheritance approach but is difficult to reconcile with other
prominent theoretical approaches (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
These results speak directly to competing for theoretical per-
spectives on the origins of religious disbelief culled from
sociology, social psychology, evolutionary psychology, cogni-
tive science of religion, cultural evolution, and gene–culture
coevolution.
Alternatives and Limitations
Of the four primary atheism predictors that we used to test pro-
minent theories, religious CREDs emerged as a clear empirical
winner. In some ways, however, our tests may have been meth-
odologically stacked in this variable’s favor. Like the
self-reports of religious disbelief, this measure includes
self-report items about religious upbringing. Thus, there is
shared method variance associated with this predictor that is
less evident for others. Also, although the CREDs–atheism
relationship is consistent with a cultural transmission frame-
work, heritability of religiosity may also contribute to atheists
coming from families who aren’t visibly religious. The mea-
sure we used is unable to resolve this. Further, our various key
predictors varied in both reliability and demonstrated validity.
We chose these measures simply because they have been used
in previous research; that said, previous use does not necessa-
rily imply that the measures were sufficient.
As with measurement quality, sample diversity is a recurrent
concern in psychological research (Henrich et al., 2010; Rad
et al., 2018; Saab et al., 2020). Most psychology research
nowadays emerges from convenience samples of undergradu-
ates and Mechanical Turk workers. These samples are fine for
some purposes, quite limited for others (Gaither, 2019), and are
known to depart from representativeness (Callegaro et al.,
2014; MacInnis et al., 2018). While our nationally representa-
tive sampling allows us to generalize beyond samples, we can
access for free (in lab) or cheap (MTurk), even a large nation-
ally representative sample barely scratches the surface of
human diversity (Henrich et al., 2010; Rad et al., 2018; Saab
et al., 2020). As such, we encourage similar analyses across
different cultures (Willard & Cingl, 2017). Diversifying the
samples that make up the empirical portfolio of evolutionary
approaches to religion is especially necessary because cultural
cues themselves emerged as the strongest predictor of disbelief
in this and related work (Gervais & Najle, 2015; Gervais et al.,
2018; Maij et al., 2017; Willard & Cingl, 2017). Without
diverse samples, including and especially extending well
beyond nationally representative samples in the United States,
researchers can only aspire to ever more precisely answer a
mere outlier of an outlier of our most important scientific ques-
tions about human nature.
We measured and tested predictors of religious belief and
disbelief. This outcome measure is quite narrow in scope, in
Figure 2. Posterior densities illustrating how strongly each factor
predicts disbelief. Height in each density indexes credibility of
estimate: Values higher up each curve are better guesses.
Figure 3. Cognitive reflection primarily predicts disbelief among
individuals who are also relatively low in exposure to religious CREDs.
Each cluster contains 100 regression lines drawn from the posterior
to illustrate estimate uncertainty and regions of the highest posterior
density. Y-axis depicts the entire range of possible values for the
arbitrarily scaled continuous measure.
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terms of the broader construct of religiosity. Further, our Super-
natural Belief Scale—while it has been used across cultures—
is fairly Judeo-Christian-centric. We suspect that a broader
consideration of religiosity in diverse societies may yield dif-
ferent patterns. The Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich,
Democratic (WEIRD) people problem isn’t just a sampling
issue; it also reflects an overreliance on the theories, constructs,
and instruments developed by WEIRD researchers to test their
weird hunches.
Although it is not featured in any of the core theoretical
perspectives we evaluated, social liberalism was consistently
the strongest covariate of religious disbelief. The intersection
of religious and political ideology is an interesting topic in its
own right and merits further consideration. Interestingly, disbe-
lief if anything was associated with fiscal conservatism in this
sample. This suggests that simple “believers are conservative”
tropes are oversimplifications. Ideology and religiosity are
multifaceted and dissociable, but certainly of interest given
rampant political polarization in the United States and else-
where. That said, religion–ideology associations, whatever
they may be, are largely orthogonal to existing cultural and
evolutionary theories of religious belief and disbelief.
Theoretical Implications
We simultaneously evaluated predictions about the origins of
disbelief from three prominent theoretical perspectives: secu-
larization, cognitive byproduct, and dual inheritance. Compar-
ing the predictions in Table 1 with the results of Figure 2,
results were most consistent with the dual inheritance perspec-
tive, the only theoretical perspective that predicted prominent
roles for both inCREDulous atheism and analytic atheism.
Given the primacy of cultural learning in our data, any model
that does not rely heavily on context-biased cultural learning
is likely a poor fit for explaining the origins of religious disbe-
lief. By extension, such theoretical models are necessarily
incomplete or faulty evolutionary accounts of religion. Simply
growing up in a home with relatively fewer credible displays of
faith predicted disbelief, contra prior assertions from the cogni-
tive science of religion that disbelief results from “special
cultural conditions” and “a good degree of cultural scaffolding”
(Barrett, 2010).
Analytic atheism is probably the most discussed avenue to
disbelief in the literature (Pennycook et al., 2016; Shenhav
et al., 2012) and broader culture (Dawkins, 2006). Although
in this sample, there was consistent evidence of analytic athe-
ism, the overall trend was modest, the trend itself varied con-
siderably across exposure to CREDs, and sufficient religious
CREDs buffered believers against the putatively corrosive
influence of reflective cognition on faith. Despite claims that
atheism generally requires cognitive effort or reflection
(Barrett, 2010; Boyer, 2008), cognitive reflection was only
modestly related to atheism in these data. These results, taken
alongside other evidence accumulating from similar studies
(Farias et al., 2017; Gervais et al., 2018; Willard & Cingl,
2017), may suggest that early claims surrounding the primacy
of effortful cognitive reflection as a necessary predictor of
atheism may have been overenthusiastic. Analytic thinking
predicts atheism in some contexts but is far from primary.
It is initially puzzling that existential security proved largely
impotent in our analyses, as it appears to be an important factor
in explaining cross-cultural differences in religiosity (Barber,
2013; Inglehart & Norris, 2004; Solt et al., 2011). It is possible
that our analyses were at the wrong level of analysis to capture
the influence of existential security, which may act as a precur-
sor to other cultural forces. There may actually be a two-stage
generational process whereby existential security demotivates
religious behavior in one generation, leading the subsequent
generation to atheism as they do not witness CREDs of faith.
This longitudinal societal prediction merits future investigation.
Finally, this work has implications beyond religion. Presum-
ably, many beliefs arise from an interaction between core cog-
nitive faculties, motivation, cultural exposure, and cognitive
style. The general dual inheritance framework adopted here
may prove fruitful for other sorts of beliefs elsewhere. Indeed,
a thorough exploration of the degree to which different beliefs
are predicted by cultural exposure relative to other cognitive
factors may be useful for exploring content- versus
context-biased cultural learning and the contributions of trans-
mitted and evoked culture. As this is a prominent point of
contention between different schools of human evolutionary
thought (Laland & Brown, 2011), such as evolutionary psy-
chology and cultural evolution, further targeted investigation
may be productive.
Coda
The importance of transmitted culture and context-biased
cultural learning as a predictor of belief and disbelief cannot
be overstated. Combined, this work suggests that if you are
guessing whether or not individuals are believers or atheists,
you are better-off knowing how their parents behaved—Did
they tithe? Pray regularly? Attend synagogue?—than how they
themselves process information. Further, our interaction analy-
ses suggest that sufficiently strong cultural exposure yields sus-
tained religious commitment even in the face of the putatively
corrosive influence of cognitive reflection. Theoretically, these
results fit well within a dual inheritance approach, as evolved
cognitive capacities for cultural learning prove to be the most
potent predictor of individual differences in the cross-
culturally canalized expression of religious belief. Atheists are
becoming increasingly common in the world, not because
human psychology is fundamentally changing but rather
because evolved cognition remains fairly stable in the face of
a rapidly changing cultural context that is itself the product
of a coevolutionary process. Faith emerges in some cultural
contexts, and atheism is the natural result in others.
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Notes
1. Anecdotally, many-to-most graduate students in cognitive science
of religion have tried these studies to no avail.
2. Analyses treating each core pathway in isolation rather than in a
single combined model are presented in the Online Supplement.
3. Note: Our precise sample demographics may look a bit different
from census estimates on, for example, ethnicity or education.
Growth from Knowledge provided proper probability sampling for
representativeness, but our precise measures were not identical to
those used by the census. Apparent discrepancies may be due to
differing demographic measures and categories, rather than prob-
ability sampling errors.
4. Values in brackets are 97% highest posterior density interval.
5. p (b > 0 | data) ¼ 1 indicates a posterior probability exceeding .99.
6. We preregistered a possible quadratic relationship between menta-
lizing and disbelief. For theoretical and statistical reasons, we
depart from preregistration and don’t analyze the quadratic here.
See Online Supplement for further discussion.
7. Preregistered analyses probing for interactions with mentalizing
yielded nothing of particular note and are summarized in the
Online Supplement.
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